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Abstract
Researchers commonly “shrink” raw quality measures based on statistical criteria.
This paper studies when and how this transformation’s statistical properties would
confer economic benefits to a utility-maximizing decisionmaker, for many asymmetric
information environments. The presence of an econometric endogeneity could cause
the data transformation to do either worse or better than the untransformed data.
I develop the results for an application measuring teacher quality. I use data from
Los Angeles to confirm the presence of the econometric endogeneity and show that
the simpler raw measure would outperform the one most commonly used in teacher
incentive schemes.
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1 Introduction
In response to what is thought to be excessive noise present in directly observed measures
of important economic inputs (e.g., teacher quality), many researchers and practitioners
transform raw measures by “shrinking” them towards the population mean. Shrinking the
raw measure by a factor decreasing in the number of observations used to compute it results in
a “shrinkage estimator”, which minimizes mean squared error, making it the best predictor.
This well-known statistical property (Copas (1983); Morris (1983)) has motivated the use of
shrinkage estimators to inform decisions in a large number of policy-relevant applications,
including (but not limited to) the estimation of teacher quality (Rockoff (2004); Kane et al.
(2008); Chetty et al. (2014a,b)), school quality (Raudenbush and Bryk (1986); Angrist et al.
(2017)), and neighborhood effects (Oakes (2004); Chetty and Hendren (2016)). Shrinkage
estimators have also been used to set insurance premia (Makov et al. (1996)) and, more
generally, in the evaluation of social programs (Rossi et al. (2003)).
The starting point for this paper is to recognize that quality measures are rarely of
intrinsic value, but rather, they are important because they are used to make decisions.
Statistically desirable properties may not confer advantages when viewed from an economic
perspective, i.e., when used by an optimizing decisionmaker in the relevant context. For
example, consider how to assign a bonus to the best teacher in a school, where the optimal
policy based on raw data would reward the teacher with the highest measured output. If
the best teacher had a relatively small classroom (i.e., fewer observations) and therefore was
shrunk closer to the mean, shrinking the raw measure could lower the odds of rewarding the
best teacher. It is not clear that an estimator with a lower mean squared error should always
be preferred to an unbiased one.
This paper examines whether a utility-maximizing decisionmaker in an asymmetric in-
formation environment could improve upon the shrinkage estimators pervasive in research
and practice. Because real-world incentive schemes are typically quite simple in structure
(Stiglitz (1991); Ferrall and Shearer (1999)), I first examine a practical and concrete cutoff
model, where the decisionmaker classifies agents with respect to a desired threshold to mini-
mize a weighted sum of the expected Type I and Type II errors. To study how measurement
affects output, I next study hidden type (adverse selection) and hidden action (moral haz-
ard) models, where agent quality is, respectively, fixed and endogenous. Optimal policy in
the hidden type model is a stopping rule, or reservation quality measure, which suggests an
economic intuition for the cutoff model. Optimal policy in the hidden action model, which
is based on Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987), is linear in the quality measure.
In each environment, the decisionmaker chooses the best estimator from a set containing
2
a (perhaps) naive measure, the raw, or unshrunken, quality measure, and the ubiquitous
shrunken measure by comparing the value obtained under optimal policy—that is, maxi-
mized expected utility—for each estimator. Estimators in this set yield the clearest insights
because they only differ by how much they weigh sample data, which increases in the number
of observations, or sample size, per agent. For example, in the context of estimating teacher
quality these weights depend on class size; if class size systematically differed between teach-
ers then the amount of shrinkage could be econometrically endogenous to underlying quality.
The theoretical analysis shows that taking into account the decisionmaker’s optimiza-
tion behavior can undo or even reverse an estimator’s statistical advantages. The main
theoretical result—that the relationship between sample size and quality determines the
preferred estimator—is common across environments. When sample sizes (and thus, shrink-
age) are constant, optimal policy would undo any shrinkage, eliminating the desirable sta-
tistical properties of shrinkage estimators, resulting in the decisionmaker being indifferent
between estimators. Nonconstant sample sizes that are related to quality result in “differen-
tial shrinkage”, creating a difference in the value according to each estimator. For example,
when sample size is negative quadratic in quality the decisionmaker would prefer the raw
quality measure and when it is positive quadratic in quality she would prefer the shrunken
one.
I develop the analysis using a highly policy-relevant application: the measurement of
teacher quality. The fact that only a small amount of variation in student achievement
is explained by teachers’ observed characteristics (Hanushek (1986); Rivkin et al. (2005))
and evidence that teacher quality is an important determinant of human capital (Hanushek
(2011); Chetty et al. (2014a)) have spurred the introduction of teacher incentive schemes.
For example, President Obama’s Race to the Top initiative incentivizes states to adopt
incentive pay schemes and the Teacher Advancement Program has introduced performance-
based bonuses to over 20,000 teachers serving over 200,000 students across the U.S.1 In
addition to being a linchpin of education reform, teacher incentive schemes may be the most
visible incarnation of performance-based incentives in the public sector. The concern that
teacher quality measures can be quite noisy (Baker and Barton (2010)), which may subject
teachers to undue risk if directly used in high-powered incentive schemes, and the fact that
they minimize mean squared error has motivated the use of shrinkage estimators—most
commonly “empirical Bayes”—in this application.2
1http://www.tapsystem.org/
2For example, American Federation of Teachers President Randi Weingarten said in a 2012 interview
about releasing VA scores to the public: “I fought against it because we knew value-added was based on a
series of assumptions and not ready for prime-time. But back then, we didn’t realize the error rates could
be as high as 50 percent!” (Goldstein (2012)).
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The theoretical environments described above are relevant for studying teacher quality,
where the decisionmaker could be a school district administrator, a public official interested in
cost-effective ways of increasing educational production. As I document in Appendix A, the
cutoff model matches the structure of the vast majority of existing teacher incentive schemes,
which typically use empirical Bayes to measure teacher quality when assigning bonuses or
even dismissing teachers; it could also be used to model pay-for-percentile-type schemes,
which are tournament-based schemes that have recently become popular in education policy
debates (Barlevy and Neal (2012)).3 Optimal policies in the asymmetric information models
take on the natural interpretation of reward, or wage, schedules that weakly increase in
measured quality. The optimal stopping rule in the hidden type model is a step function,
where teachers with above-threshold measures receive the same (positive) salary and those
below receive a wage of zero (meaning they are dismissed). The optimal wage schedule in
the hidden action model is a constant base salary, with a performance-based bonus linear
(and increasing) in measured quality.
The aforementioned econometric endogeneity concern is germane to measuring teacher
quality. The idea that class size can reflect information about teacher quality has theoret-
ical precedent (Lazear (2001); Barrett and Toma (2013)) and researchers have found that
higher-quality teachers tend to have more favorable working conditions, in terms of student
characteristics (Player (2010), Clotfelter et al. (2006)); it is not a big leap to extend this
reasoning to class size. Therefore, an estimator that minimizes mean squared error may not
maximize the administrator’s value, e.g., if shrinking makes it harder to reward high effort
or fire the worst teachers.
The empirical part of the application uses data from the Los Angeles Unified School
District, the second-largest school district in the U.S. and one with a large degree of diver-
sity and variation in both student achievement and class size (Buddin (2011)). I find that
class sizes are smallest for the lowest- and highest-quality teachers, which is the scenario in
which the raw quality measure would be preferred to the shrunken measure in each envi-
ronment. There is reason to also expect the type of econometric endogeneity I document in
Los Angeles—a negative quadratic relationship between class size and teacher quality—in
other locales. Suppose that, in the background of the administrator’s optimization problem,
school principals wanted to have students pass a low proficiency threshold and increase total
output at their respective schools. The former could cause class size to increase in teacher
quality at the low end of the quality distribution. However, due to the lack of flexible wages
in the public education sector, school principals might also reduce class size at the high end
3The cutoff model also allows us to be agnostic about what underlies variation in measured output, which
could be due to hidden types and/or actions.
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of the distribution to retain high-quality teachers. This paper remains agnostic about the
source of this relationship; all that matters for the study of estimator performance is that
such a relationship exists. Examining the source of the relationship between class size and
teacher quality would be interesting for future research.
Finally, I calibrate additional parameters to quantitatively compare the prospective per-
formance of the estimators, finding nontrivial benefits to using raw quality measures. For
example, in the cutoff model an administrator would make 9% more classification errors
when using empirical Bayes when seeking to identify teachers in the bottom 1% in Read-
ing value-added and switching from empirical Bayes would increase output by 2% in the
hidden action model. The performance of the estimators in the cutoff model differs most
at the tails of the distribution of teacher quality, which is important for identifying either
high- or low-quality teachers, the focus of existing teacher incentive schemes (e.g., the Wash-
ington D.C. Schools Chancellor fired 241 teachers in 2010 based on performance measures
(Turque (2010)).4 The sheer number of schemes and affected teachers and students and
increasing policy support for teacher incentive schemes point to substantial gains from using
the preferred estimator for the relevant context, especially in light of the relatively costless
“intervention” of adopting a simpler quality measure.
Section 2 presents statistical background for the models used in this paper. Section 3
develops and analyzes the cutoff model and Section 4 presents the hidden type and hidden
action models. Section 5 presents the quantitative results and Section 6 concludes. The
Appendix documents a number of teacher incentive schemes and also contains proofs and
further details about the quantitative results.
2 Statistical Background
The application to measure teacher quality is based on the leading conceptual framework
for teacher quality, the value-added model (Murnane (1975); Hanushek (1979)), which uses
changes in students’ test scores over the year to measure the contribution (i.e., quality) of
individual teachers. There is a literature studying the statistical properties of the value-
added framework, with the main concern that the omission of important inputs may bias
estimates (e.g., McCaffrey et al. (2003), Glazerman et al. (2010)). However, several recent
studies have found that value-added models are fairly good at accounting for unobserved
inputs (Kinsler (2012a,b), Chetty et al. (2014a), Kinsler (2016)). This will likely further
4The recent outcry about a case where teacher value-added was incorrectly calculated in Washington DC,
which resulted in firing mistakes (Strauss (2013)), evinces the considerable public concern about misclassi-
fying public school teachers.
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increase their use in research and policy.
Manski (2004) writes that “statisticians studying estimation have long made progress
by restricting attention to tractable classes of estimators; for example, linear unbiased or
asymptotic normal ones,” (page 1231). In the same vein, I consider a set of estimators
containing a (perhaps) naive estimator based on the “raw” data, which in a value-added
framework would correspond to unbiased fixed effects, and the ubiquitous mean-square-
minimizing empirical Bayes. I show below in Remark 1 that this is a natural set to consider.5
Clearly, the unconstrained class of optimal estimators would potentially condition on all
available information, because the administrator could simply ignore information that was
not valuable (Ho¨lmstrom (1979)). No existing teacher incentive scheme does this. Therefore,
in each environment I focus on the less trivial and more relevant case where the administrator
chooses the (constrained) optimal estimator from the set described above.
Teacher quality is distributed according to θi ∼ F = N (0, σ2θ), where F is known.6 As
discussed in the introduction, the number of students assigned to teacher i, ni, may depend
on i’s quality. For simplicity, I assume that class size depends on θ, where I sometimes
denote this dependence by writing n(θ).7 If class size were instead a noisy signal of teacher
quality, the model solution would be more complicated without changing which estimator
the administrator would prefer. Note that what matters is the end relationship n(θ); whether
it is the result of school principals assigning smaller class sizes to certain teachers or, say,
teacher lobbying effort does not affect the results.
The test score gain for student j assigned to teacher i is yji = θi+ji, where measurement
error ji ∼ N (0, σ2 ) and ji ⊥ θi. I adopt this spare technology to simplify exposition; the
quantitative results use value-added estimates that control for many characteristics.
The fixed-effects (FE) estimator of θi is the sample mean, i.e., θˆ
FE
i =
∑
j
yji
ni
= θi + i,
and, given true quality θi, is distributed according to θˆ
FE
i ∼ N
(
θi,
σ2
ni
)
. The empirical Bayes
(EB) estimator of teacher value-added updates the prior (i.e., population) distribution of θi
with data {yji}j. Because both the prior distribution and measurement errors are normal,
the posterior distribution is also normal, giving θˆEBi = λiθˆ
FE
i + (1 − λi) E [θ]︸︷︷︸
0
= λiθˆ
FE
i =
5The framework developed here could also be used to study other classes of estimators.
6I follow standard assumptions that teacher quality is normally distributed in the population, and that
E [θ] is normalized to 0.
7If the number of students assigned to a teacher was a strictly monotonic function of teacher quality,
teacher rankings could be perfectly recovered by comparing class sizes. Therefore, I assume in this section
that the administrator cannot directly condition on class size; Appendix B.1 provides results for the case
where the administrator may directly incorporate class sizes in her policy. There are two reasons to avoid this
direct conditioning. Including class size would provide school principals with a direct incentive to manipulate
class size, outside of any effects of class size on total output. Additionally, doing so would complicate the
scheme, potentially reducing its attractiveness to policymakers
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λi(θi + i), where λi =
σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
 /ni
is the ratio of the true variation in teacher quality (signal)
relative to the estimated variation using the fixed effects estimator (signal plus noise).8 I
express the dependence of the weights on class size by writing λ(n(θ)) or λ(ni), or the
reduced-form λ(θ), depending on which is more convenient. How much the empirical Bayes
estimator is shifted towards the population mean depends on ni: λ(ni) → 1 as the number
of students observed for a teacher ni increases, causing all the weight to be shifted to the
sample mean.9 Note the empirical Bayes estimate for a particular teacher’s quality is biased,
i.e., E
[
θˆi
EB
]
= λ(θ)θi 6= θi, but also has a lower variance. Though the exposition here is
for fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators, this bias-variance tradeoff would also apply
to comparisons of other shrunken versus unshrunken estimators.
The fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators differ only by the weights λ, making it
simple to also consider estimators with intermediate weights by considering convex combi-
nations of θˆEBi and θˆ
FE
i , resulting in a set of candidate estimators [θˆ
EB
i , θˆ
FE
i ]. I obtain the
optimal estimator by first analyzing the end points of this set (i.e., fixed effects and empirical
Bayes) and then considering whether interior weights would be optimal.
Remark 1 (Class size). Note that because the estimators only differ by λi, which in turn
only differs between teachers via class size ni, the analysis will focus on variation in class
size without loss of generality.
3 Cutoff-Based Model
In this section I develop a cutoff model, which formalizes the objective of utility-maximizing
decisionmaker, a school-district administrator; characterizes her optimal cutoff policy; and
shows the relationship among (i) how class size varies with teacher quality, (ii) her choice
of estimator, and (iii) her expected maximized utility, i.e., value. To most closely match
existing policies, she takes as given an exogenous desired cutoff (for example, she is told to
give bonuses to the top 5% quality teachers or to fire the lowest 1% quality teachers in the
district) and chooses a cutoff policy, which may depend on estimator type, to maximize her
8McCaffrey et al. (2003) discusses the differences between fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators.
9A common variant of the empirical Bayes estimator also estimates the overall mean of θ. If the overall
mean of θ is not parameterized according to another distribution, the empirical Bayes estimator may not be
deemed “fully” Bayesian.
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expected objective over all teachers in the district.10
I begin with this model for several reasons. First, as will be shown below, her objective can
be measured in terms of the number of correct and incorrect classifications with respect to the
desired cutoff, embedding the administrator’s objective in a natural metric: the expected
number of mistakes. Second, a discrete policy is a natural fit for modeling discrete real-
world policies like retention, making the analysis in this paper highly relevant for the most
pervasive, and perhaps the most contentious, education policy debates.11 Third, even though
they are not obliged to take such a form, almost all existing teacher incentive schemes for
public school teachers are cutoff-based, making this model’s results immediately applicable
to the vast majority of existing teacher incentive schemes; as noted by Stiglitz (1991) and
Ferrall and Shearer (1999), real-world incentive schemes typically take very simple forms.
Fourth, related literature also considers cutoff-based policies, e.g., Staiger and Rockoff (2010),
Hanushek (2011), Tincani (2012), Chetty et al. (2014b), and Rothstein (2014). Finally, the
cutoff-based model’s flexibility allows us to be agnostic about what underlies variation in
measured output, which could be due to heterogeneity in fixed teacher productivity types
and/or unobserved actions.
Model Specification The administrator receives utility from correctly rewarding a teacher
with true quality equal to or higher than the desired cutoff κ (not making a Type I error)
and not rewarding a teacher with true quality below κ (not making a Type II error). The
administrator’s utility from using estimator θˆ and cutoff policy c on a teacher of true quality
θ is:
uCP (θ, θˆ; c, κ) = α 1{θˆ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
avoid Type I error
+(1− α) 1{θˆ < c ∩ θ < κ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
avoid Type II error
,
where α and (1−α) are her weights on not making Type I and II errors, respectively.12 The
parameter α helps link the model to the institutional context. An administrator tasked with
firing the lowest-quality teachers might be willing to make many more Type I errors to avoid
10Other work compares the statistical performance of different methods of estimating value-added. Scho-
chet and Chiang (2012) calculate error rates for fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators of teacher
quality, assuming a fixed (identical) cutoff policy. Tate (2004) notes that ranks formed by fixed effects and
empirical Bayes may differ depending on class size, but does not embed the analysis within a decision prob-
lem. Guarino et al. (2015) compare the performance of fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators, with a
focus on how they perform when students are not randomly assigned to teachers.
11Section 4.1.1 explores similarities between the cutoff-based objective and optimal policy in a hidden type
environment.
12I also analyze a version of the model where the administrator’s objective is increasing in the distance
between teacher quality and the cutoff. The administrator’s preferred estimator would not change. Quanti-
tatively, this change would inflate the performance difference between the estimators. Results are available
upon request.
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a Type II error (i.e., α < 1/2). Alternatively, a high value of α may be more appropriate for
an administrator allocating performance bonuses from a tight budget. If α = 1 − α = 1/2
the administrator values Type I and II errors equally.
Expected utility under the fixed effects estimator and candidate cutoff policy cFE inte-
grates the administrator’s objective over the distributions of teacher quality and measure-
ment error:
E
[
uCP (θ, θˆ
FE ; cFE , κ)
]
= αPr{θˆFE ≥ cFE ∩ θ ≥ κ}+ (1− α) Pr{θˆFE < cFE ∩ θ < κ}
= α
∫ ∞
κ
(
1− Φ
(
cFE − θ
σ(n(θ))
))
dF (θ|θ ≥ κ) + (1− α)
∫ κ
−∞
Φ
(
cFE − θ
σ(n(θ)
)
dF (θ|θ < κ),
(1)
where σ(n(θ)) ≡ σ√
n(θ)
and F (θ|θ ≥ κ) = φ(θ/σθ)
σθ(1−Φ(κ/σθ)) and F (θ|θ < κ) =
φ(θ/σθ)
σθΦ(κ/σθ)
are
the distribution functions for θ, truncated below and above κ, respectively. Expected utility
under the empirical Bayes estimator and candidate cutoff policy cEB is
E
[
uCP (θ, θˆ
EB ; cEB , κ)
]
= αPr{θˆEB ≥ cEB ∩ θ ≥ κ}+ (1− α) Pr{θˆEB < cEB ∩ θ < κ}
= α
∫ ∞
κ
1− Φ
 cEBλ(n(θ)) − θ
σ(n(θ))
 dF (θ|θ ≥ κ) + (1− α)∫ κ
−∞
Φ
 cEBλ(n(θ)) − θ
σ(n(θ))
 dF (θ|θ < κ).
(2)
For either estimator, an increase in the prospective cutoff policy c decreases the probabil-
ity of correctly identifying a teacher with true quality above κ and increases the probability of
correctly identifying a teacher with true quality below κ. The optimal cutoff policy equates
the marginal increase in the probability of committing a Type I error (marginal cost) with
the marginal decrease in the probability of committing a Type II error (marginal benefit).
That is, c∗EB solves
α
∫ ∞
κ
1
λ(n(θ))σ(n(θ))
φ
(
c∗EB/λ(n(θ))− θ
σ(n(θ))
)
dF (θ|θ ≥ κ)
= (1− α)
∫ κ
−∞
1
λ(n(θ))σ(n(θ))
φ
(
c∗EB/λ(n(θ))− θ
σ(n(θ))
)
dF (θ|θ < κ). (3)
The optimal cutoff for the fixed effects estimator c∗FE solves (3), where λ(θ) = 1,∀θ.
Denote the value to the administrator of using the optimal cutoff policies c∗FE and c∗EB as
vFECP (κ) = E
[
uCP (θ, θˆ
FE; c∗FE, κ)
]
and vEBCP (κ) = E
[
uCP (θ, θˆ
EB; c∗EB, κ)
]
, respectively. The
administrator’s value for both estimators is increasing in the signal to noise ratio σθ/σ: as
the variance of the measurement error tends to 0, σ → 0 and all teachers will be correctly
9
categorized, i.e., vFECP (κ) = v
EB
CP (κ) = 1 for all desired cutoffs κ (Appendix B.2).
Remark 2 (Full information). This analysis assumes the administrator chooses a cutoff pol-
icy based on only test score information, e.g., she cannot directly condition on class size. The
simplicity of such a policy makes it of obvious policy relevance, as is shown in Appendix Table
3, which documents existing incentive pay programs and shows that none condition on class
size (which would be required to fix the misspecification). Additionally, when compared with a
policy that may also explicitly condition on class size, a test-score-based cutoff could attenuate
issues of class size manipulation for the sake of affecting the administrator’s posterior about
the quality of a particular teacher. However, because this assumption means empirical Bayes
may be misspecified, in Appendix B.1 I consider the case in which the administrator can also
directly condition on class size (which must be adjusted to be non-deterministic functions of
teacher quality for the problem to remain nontrivial). Intuitively, the administrator would do
no worse with this extra information, as she could always choose to ignore it. Because the
obvious answer obtained in this scenario renders it of limited theoretical interest, the analysis
in this paper focuses on estimators and policies that do not directly condition on class size.
Theoretical Results I now characterize the administrator’s value of using each estimator
as a function of the relationship between teacher quality and class size. Proposition 1 shows
that if there is no relationship between teacher quality and class size, the administrator’s
value is the same under both estimators. Next, I consider the case where class size depends
on teacher quality. Proposition 2 shows that, in general, the administrator’s relative value
of the estimators depends on the relationship between class size and teacher quality. The
administrator’s value also depends on her Type I and II error weights, which are respectively
α and 1− α.
Proposition 1. The administrator receives the same value from both estimators for any
desired cutoff κ when class size is constant.
Proof. If all classes are the same size then λ(n(θ)) = λ ∈ (0, 1), ∀θ. Let c∗FE satisfy the
administrator’s first-order condition (3) when λ = 1. Because λ is constant, then c∗EB =
c∗FEλ also solves (3), and returns the same value (i.e., vFECP (κ) = v
EB
CP (κ)).
Note that Proposition 1 implies that the administrator would also be indifferent to using
any convex combination of the estimators.
Remark 3. The theoretical results, including Proposition 1, apply to deterministic class size
functions; i.e., n(θ) is degenerate for each θ. If Φ(·) were linear then the results would also
apply for the case of i.i.d. class sizes. I have verified that the results, including estimator
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rankings, do not appreciably change when the administrator also integrates over i.i.d. class
sizes; e.g., the administrator’s objective under the fixed effects estimator is
α
∫ ∞
κ
(∫ n
n
(
1− Φ
(
cFE − θ
σ/n
))
dGn(n)
)
dF (θ|θ ≥ κ) + (1− α)
∫ κ
−∞
(∫ n
n
Φ
(
cFE − θ
σ/n
)
dGn(n)
)
dF (θ|θ < κ)
= α
∫ ∞
κ
1− En
[
Φ
(
cFE − θ
σ/n
)]
dF (θ|θ ≥ κ) + (1− α)
∫ κ
−∞
En
[
Φ
(
cFE − θ
σ/n
)]
dF (θ|θ < κ),
where Gn(·) is a truncated normal random distribution chosen to fit the empirical distribution
of class sizes. Due to the simpler exposition with degenerate class sizes this assumption is
maintained. Results are available upon request.
Proposition 2 considers the case where class size may depend on teacher quality.
Proposition 2. In general, the administrator’s preferred estimator in the cutoff model de-
pends on the relationship between teacher quality and class size.
Proof. Because λ is monotonic (indeed, strictly increasing) in n, to simplify the proof’s
exposition I parameterize the empirical Bayes weights λ(·) directly as a function of θ, by
assuming there is one slope for the relationship between teacher quality and weight below
the population mean (β−) and another slope for the relationship above the population mean
(β+), where either slope can be positive, negative, or zero; the result is not sensitive to
the linearity assumed here. I also set σ = 1 for all teachers for the proof of the current
proposition, which does not drive the result;13 regardless, σ varies between teachers in the
quantitative results. The empirical Bayes weight is then
λ(θ) =
δ− + β−θ if θ < 0δ+ + β+θ if θ ≥ 0.
Suppose κ < 0 and that c∗EB < 0. Differentiating the administrator’s value with respect to
β−, we obtain
∂vEBCP
∂β−
= (1− α)
[∫ κ
−∞
−c∗EBθ
(δ− + β−θ)2
φ
(
c∗EB
δ− + β−θ
− θ
)
dF (θ|θ < κ)
]
+α
[∫ 0
κ
c∗EBθ
(δ− + β−θ)2
φ
(
c∗EB
δ− + β−θ
− θ
)
dF (θ|κ ≤ θ < 0)
]
,
because
∂vEBCP
∂c∗EB × ∂c
∗EB
∂β−
= 0 due to the Envelope Theorem. The first term is negative because
−c∗EBθ < 0 for θ < κ. Analogously, the second term is positive. Each term is the conditional
mean of c
∗EBθ
(δ−+β−θ)2
, weighted by the density φ
(
c∗EB
δ−+β−θ
− θ
)
. If α is not too extreme, the
13Details are available upon request.
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first term typically dominates because it represents the conditional mean c
∗EBθ
(δ−+β−θ)2
for the
extreme part of the distribution of θ. If the first term dominates then the administrator’s
value is decreasing in β−, i.e., the stronger is the increase in class size from teacher quality.
Analogously, if κ > 0 and c∗EB > 0 then by differentiating the administrator’s value with
respect to β+ we can see that the administrator’s value is increasing in β+, meaning that
increasing the weight associated with teacher fixed effects for teachers above the population
mean improves the administrator’s value.
Reducing the slope of class size in teacher quality for below-average teachers and in-
creasing the slope of class size in teacher quality for above-average teachers improves the
administrator’s utility from using the empirical Bayes estimator. In particular, suppose we
started from a constant class size, i.e., λ(θ) = δ; if we then shifted β− > 0 and β+ < 0, the
fixed effects estimator would provide the administrator with higher expected utility.
Note that interior convex combinations of the estimators will not be optimal; this can be
seen by manipulating σ, which does not affect the preferred estimator. Intuitively, if one
estimator is better at identifying certain teachers than the other, an intermediate estimator
would also be outperformed by the corner.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 2 by plotting the expected utility of the administrator
under the fixed effects estimator (solid red line) and the empirical Bayes estimator (dotted
blue line) as a function of the cutoff policy for each estimator (x-axis), where class size
is increasing in teacher quality, i.e., β−, β+ > 0, meaning that lower-quality teachers are
weighted closer to the population mean than higher-quality teachers. Each curve traces
out the administrator’s expected utility as a function of cutoff policies, given an exogenous
desired cutoff quality κ. The utility-maximizing cutoff policy for each estimator is indicated
by a vertical line c∗estimator(κ), where the administrator’s value from using that estimator,
v∗estimatorCP (κ), is the maximum of each curve. If the administrator desires to separate the
lowest quality teachers from the rest (Figure 1a), the re-weighting inherent in the empirical
Bayes estimator can actually reverse teacher rankings and lead to a lower expected objective
for the administrator than when the fixed effects estimator is used. The opposite is true for
when the administrator wishes to separate the top teachers from the rest (Figure 1c); here,
the peak of the empirical Bayes curve is higher. Intuitively, the empirical Bayes estimator is
now dilating the estimated teacher quality further than the fixed effects estimator, reducing
the probability the administrator makes a ranking error. When the administrator only
desires to separate the upper and lower half quality teachers (Figure 1b), fixed effects and
empirical Bayes both obtain the same maximum height, i.e., they return the same expected
objective. An increase in either δ− or δ+ corresponds to an increase in the signal-to-noise
ratio. Intuitively, an increase in the signal provided by student test scores increases λ,
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Figure 1: Administrator’s objective, assuming class size increasing in teacher quality
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Figure 2: Difference between administrator’s objective under fixed effects and empirical
Bayes, by class size scenario and desired cut point
Desired cut percentile F (κ)
R
at
io
of
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
or
va
lu
e
v
F
E
C
P
(κ
)/
v
E
B
C
P
(κ
)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
const.
inc.
neg. quad.
pos. quad.
reducing the dependence of the weight on teacher quality.
Figure 2 summarizes the theoretical results for the cutoff model by comparing the per-
formance of the estimators by plotting the ratio in value functions for the administrator
(vFECP (κ)/v
EB
CP (κ)) as a function of the desired cut percentile F (κ) (x-axis), for scenarios
where class size is constant, increasing in teacher quality, negative quadratic in teacher qual-
ity, and positive quadratic in teacher quality (average class size is the same across scenarios).
For simplicity, α has been set to 1/2; Appendix B.3 shows this does not drive the findings
for the vast majority of α values. Of course, if α took an extremely high value (i.e., α→ 1),
the second term in ∂v
∂β−
above would dominate; intuitively, if the administrator did not value
correctly identifying teachers below κ, their value would increase in β−.
For each κ, estimator, and class size scenario, I solve for the administrator’s optimal
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cutoff policy and plug it into her objective, returning vestimator(κ). The vertical axis then plots
vFECP (κ)/v
EB
CP (κ) corresponding to the desired cutoff associated with the desired cut percentile
F (κ). As shown before, when class size is constant (dotted black line), the empirical Bayes
cutoff is just a scaled version of the fixed effects cutoff and the administrator’s value is the
same under fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators—i.e., vFECP (κ)/v
EB
CP (κ) = 1 for all
κ. When class size is increasing in teacher quality (short-dashed red line), the fixed effects
estimator performs better than the empirical Bayes estimator when the administrator wishes
to separate teachers of low quality from the rest (Figure 1a), while the empirical Bayes
estimator performs better when the administrator wishes to isolate high-quality teachers
(Figure 1c). When class size has a negative-quadratic relationship with teacher quality
(dot-dashed blue line), similar to the case in Proposition 2 where β− > 0 and β+ < 0, it
is increasing when teacher quality is low and decreasing when teacher quality is high; in
the example considered in Figure 2, the fixed effects estimator outperforms the empirical
Bayes estimator at both the lowest and highest desired cutoffs. Finally, when class size is a
positive-quadratic function of teacher quality (long-dashed brown line), the opposite is true.
Figure 2 also demonstrates that the difference between the performance of fixed effects and
empirical Bayes estimators decreases the closer the desired cut point is to the population
mean of 0. Intuitively, there is less of a difference between both the estimates resulting from
the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators when the administrator seeks to identify
teachers as being on either side of the population mean (see Proposition 8 in Appendix B.4
for a proof that the administrator would be indifferent if her problem is symmetric).
Remark 4 (Pay for percentile). The cutoff model could be applied to a tournament-based
scheme e.g., “pay-for-percentile” (Barlevy and Neal (2012)) by considering an arbitrarily
large sequence of desired cutoffs and associated bonuses for being above them, which means
the above results are also relevant for practitioners considering the design of such schemes
or other, potentially continuous and nonlinear, ones.14
Remark 5 (One-period model). The model developed here is for one period. Although using
an arbitrarily large number of periods when attempting to classify teachers would increase
estimator precision and, hence, administrator value, doing so would preclude using schemes
for many important decisions, such as termination of extremely low-quality inexperienced
teachers.
14Further note that one would also want to take into account the possibility of “differential shrinkage”
when finding a comparable set of teachers, which is required by the scheme derived by Barlevy and Neal
(2012).
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4 Asymmetric Information Models
4.1 Hidden Type Model
This section develops a hidden type, or adverse selection, model.15 It starts by considering a
general version, Model HT-G, which derives the administrator’s optimal policy when she can
observe a fairly general output signal. In the cutoff model the administrator was assumed to
follow a cutoff policy. In contrast, this section shows that such a policy would emerge as the
optimal one in a general hidden type environment. This is useful because if a certain type
of policy is optimal for the general signal in Model HT-G then it would also be optimal for
the specific estimators considered in subsequent sections.
4.1.1 Model HT-G
There are T periods, indexed by t, and J classrooms, or slots, indexed by j, where slot j has
nj students. As in the cutoff model, the administrator can provide rewards (or sanctions)
to teachers, but class sizes may be determined by school principals. As in the real world,
the administrator may condition on quality signals but not directly on other data, e.g., class
sizes. Let I denote the set of potential teachers, or applicants, who are indexed by i. Per-
student output from slot j being filled by teacher i in period t is qit = β0 + θi(j,t), where
θi is teacher i’s quality and output for slot j is zero if it has not been assigned a teacher
(i.e., i(j, t) = ∅). The quality of applicants for teaching positions is distributed according
to θi ∼ N (µ, σ2θ), where, as in the cutoff model, µ = 0. Any teacher i in the applicant
pool would accept a teaching job if offered a wage at least as high as w. As in Staiger and
Rockoff (2010), there is an arbitrarily large number of teachers for each slot, which is not
very restrictive because changes in the distribution of teacher quality could be modeled by
suitably adjusting the distribution of θ.
Teacher quality is not observed by the administrator, who, after the end of each period
only observes a noisy signal of mean output qˆit ∼ Gqˆ(qˆit|qit). As in the cutoff model, the
distribution of the output signal depends on true output q. However, I make a weaker
assumption here, thatGqˆ satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), which is
consistent with many distributions of measurement error on output—in particular, normally
distributed errors (Karlin and Rubin (1956)), which are ubiquitous in value-added models.
Hiring a teacher costs χ output, where χ > 0. Let It denote the subset of I who are employed
as teachers in t. Let Hit denote the history of signals for teacher i that are observed at the
beginning of period t, i.e., Hit = {qˆiτ}τ<t, where the number of previous signals for i is |Hit|.
15This environment is partially based on one developed in Staiger and Rockoff (2010). See page 2 of their
Online Appendix.
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In each period, the administrator chooses a hiring policy ψh,t(·) and a reward policy
ψr,t(·) to maximize her expected objective, where ψr,t(·) consists of a wage wi(j,t), paid at the
beginning of the period, and a retention decision, made after that period’s signals have been
realized. The administrator chooses {ψh,t(·), ψr,t(·)}t∈T to maximize expected discounted
total output, net the cost of her policy:
uHTG =
∑
t
δt−1 Et
[(∑
j
qi(j,t),t − wi(j,t) − 1{|Hi(j,t),t| = 0}χ
)]
, (4)
where δ is the discount rate, Et [·] denotes the expectation using information available at
period t, and |Hi(j,t),t| = 0 means i is a new hire in period t.
Theoretical Results For simplicity, assume β0 = 0 and set w = 0.
16 Then, ψh,t(·) will be
a list of |Jt| random numbers for indices i ∈ I/It, where Jt denotes the set of empty slots
at the beginning of period t (i.e., Jt = J in the first period and then the slots with just-
dismissed teachers thereafter). Now consider the administrator’s choice of how to reward a
given portfolio of teachers, ψr(·). In general, ψr(·) could depend on all signals (i.e., from
the most recent and also earlier periods) of all currently employed teachers, and may have a
complicated functional form. Proposition 3 greatly simplifies the solution.
Proposition 3. The administrator’s optimal policy ψr,t(·), for i ∈ It, will have the reserva-
tion value property consisting a stopping region and, if Gqˆ satisfies the MLRP, a continuation
region above.
Proof. First, note that the additive separability of (4) implies we can split it into J separate
problems. Lippman and McCall (1976) proves that the optimal policy for each problem
has a reservation value property (see also Rothschild (1974)). Examination of (4) shows
that the administrator’s objective is increasing in output qit, and therefore also increasing in
expected output. If the MLRP holds, this implies that ∂ E[qit|qˆit]
∂qˆit
> 0, i.e., the posterior mean
of a teacher’s quality is increasing in signal qˆit. Then, there will then be a region in which the
administrator will retain the teacher (i.e., a continuation region) and below which she will
pay χ to replace her (i.e., a stopping region). Finally, within the continuation region note
that the administrator would not gain from paying additional wages per each slot, meaning
that ψr,t will feature a wage payment of wψr,t = w = 0 and the retention decision will have
16This assumption is consistent with the administrator leaving no slots empty. An alternative would be
to assume β0 is such that the administrator would find it optimal to fill an empty slot j with a random hire
from the pool of applicants, i.e., expected output is β0 + E [θ] = β0 + µ > χ+ w. This would encumber the
notation without changing the result.
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a reservation value property. Also note that variation in nj does not affect the optimality of
a reservation value policy, provided Gqˆ satisfies the MLRP.
The optimality of a reservation-value policy is typical of optimal stopping problems, of
which the current model is an example, and suggests a link with the cutoff model from
Section 3. However, the administrator’s objective (4) is quite general, which complicates
obtaining theoretical results about how the administrator would prefer to measure teacher
quality and relating results from the hidden type model to those from the cutoff-based model.
Therefore, in Section 4.1.2 I study Model HT-0, a version of Model HT-G with two periods
and constant class sizes. Model HT-1, in Appendix C.1, shows how a multi-period model,
which allows teachers to become more productive as they gain experience, can be mapped
into a series comprised of the second period of different HT-0 models. Model HT-2, in
Appendix C.2, extends HT-0 to examine the case of variable class sizes. As with Model
HT-0, a multi-period version of Model HT-2 could be related back to the second period of
Model HT-2.
4.1.2 Model HT-0
There are two periods (T = 2) and teacher quality is fixed over time. Each slot j holds n > 0
students, which corresponds to the constant class size scenario for the cutoff-based model.
Output per slot is noisily measured according to qˆjit = qjit + jit, where jit ∼ N (0, σ2/n)
and E [jit|qjit] = E [jit] = 0. Let ρ = σ2θ/(σ2θ + σ
2

n
) be the signal reliability, i.e., the amount
of information about teacher quality in the output measure.
Theoretical Results As with Model HT-G, in the first period the administrator hires at
random from the pool of potential teachers. Therefore, I focus on the second period and
suppress the period subscript t and discount rate δ. In the second period she can choose
to either retain or replace each teacher i ∈ I1 based on information from the first period.
Proposition 3 shows the optimal solution has a reservation value property. Our goal then is
to characterize the marginal signal q in the distribution of first-period signals qˆ.
Per slot, the administrator’s second-period objective from reservation value policy q on
signal qˆ is
1{qˆ < q} (E [q|new hire]−χ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
dismiss teacher; fill slot immediately
+ 1{qˆ ≥ q}E [q|qˆ ≥ q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
retain teacher
= 1{qˆ < q}(E [θ|new hire]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µ=0
−χ)+1{qˆ ≥ q}E [θ|qˆ ≥ q] .
(5)
Taking expectations over the signal qˆ, we can write the administrator’s value of using esti-
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mator qˆ with replacement cost χ as
vqˆHT0(χ) = maxq
Φ
(
q
σqˆ
)
(−χ) +
(
1− Φ
(
q
σqˆ
))
E
[
θ|qˆ ≥ q] . (6)
By setting qˆ = θˆFE, the sample mean of each teacher’s observed signals during the first
period, we can then use (6) to write the administrator’s value from using the fixed effects
estimator:
vFEHT0(χ) = max
qFE
Φ
(
qFE
σθˆFE
)
(−χ) +
(
1− Φ
(
qFE
σθˆFE
))
σ2θ
σθˆFE
φ(−qFE/σθˆFE)
Φ(−qFE/σθˆFE)
, (7)
using the result for a truncated bivariate normal distribution, E
[
θ|θˆFE ≥ qFE
]
=
σ2θ
σ
θˆFE
φ(−qFE/σ
θˆFE
)
Φ(−qFE/σ
θˆFE
)
(see Greene (2003)).
We can characterize the marginal signal q∗FE by noting the administrator would be
indifferent between replacing or retaining a teacher with that signal. The administrator’s
expected utility from replacing slot j’s teacher is E [θ]−χ = −χ and her expected utility
from retaining j’s teacher is E
[
θ|θˆFE
]
, which is equal to (1− ρ)µ+ ρθˆFE = ρθˆFE by Bayes
rule. The administrator will then replace teacher i if and only if −χ
ρ
≡ q∗FE > θˆFEi(j,1). To
see this, first suppose that χ = 0, in which case the marginal teacher is of average quality
of the existing stock of teachers; since hiring in the first period is random from the pool of
applicants this means any teacher with quality expected to be below the population average
(µ) would be replaced; increasing χ would lower this threshold.
4.1.3 Relation Between Preferred Estimator in Cutoff and Hidden Type Models
The cutoff-based model in Section 3 has the advantage of being simple and embedding
the administrator’s objective in an intuitive, policy-relevant measure: the weighted sum of
classification errors. This section shows how results from the cutoff-based model may also
obtain in the hidden type environment. There are two main cases, corresponding to the
class size scenarios covered by the propositions in Section 3. Given the results from the
cutoff model, when characterizing the optimal estimator I consider the corners of the set of
estimators contained by the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators.
Constant n When class sizes are constant the administrator is indifferent between using
either estimator. This is formalized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The administrator receives the same value from both estimators for any
replacement cost χ when class size is constant.
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Proof. To obtain the administrator’s value from using the empirical Bayes estimator qˆ =
θˆEB ≡ λHT0θˆFE, where λHT0 ≡ ρ, adapt (6) for the distribution of λHT0θˆ:
vEBHT0(χ) = max
qEB
Φ
(
qEB
σθˆEB
)
(−χ) +
(
1− Φ
(
qEB
σθˆEB
))
ρ
σ2θ
σθˆEB
φ(−qEB/σθˆEB)
Φ(−qEB/σθˆEB)
= max
qEB
Φ
(
qEB
ρσθˆFE
)
(−χ) +
(
1− Φ
(
qEB
ρσθˆFE
))
ρ
σ2θ
ρσθˆFE
φ(−qEB/(ρσθˆFE))
Φ(−qEB/(ρσθˆFE))
(8)
where the second line follows because σθˆEB = ρσθˆFE . Then, if q
∗FE solves (7) then q∗EB =
ρq∗FE must solve (8) and, notably, return the same value for the administrator, i.e., vFEHT0(χ) =
vEBHT0(χ).
Therefore, as with Proposition 1 for the cutoff model, in Model HT-0 the administrator
would obtain the same value from using either estimator when class sizes are the same for all
teachers. Note also that the optimal empirical Bayes reservation signal q∗EB is shrunk toward
the population mean by exactly the same amount as was the optimal empirical Bayes cutoff
policy, suggesting an equivalence in optimal policies in the cutoff-based model and HT-0.
We can show this by setting κ = −χ and finding a Type I error weight αequiv such that
c∗FE(κ = −χ, αequiv) = q∗FE(χ). Then it will also be the case that c∗EB(κ = −χ, αequiv) =
q∗EB(χ).
Model HT-1, in Appendix C.1, shows how the results for Model HT-0—in particular,
its relation to the cutoff-based model—can be extended to allow for multiple periods and
changes in teacher output over time, say, due to the accumulation of teaching experience.
Specifically, we can map Model HT-1 to a version of Model HT-0. This is formalized in
Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Model HT-1 can be mapped to Model HT-0.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Thus, the administrator would be indifferent in her choice of estimator for HT-0 or HT-1,
i.e., when class size is constant.
Variable n Ideally, we would know that if an estimator would be preferred for every
parameterization of the cutoff model, given a class size scenario, it would also be preferred
for any hidden type environment for that class size scenario. Propositions 1, 4, and 5 show
this is the case with constant class sizes. Model HT-2 extends Model HT-0 to allow for
nonconstant class sizes. For brevity, this model is developed and analyzed in Appendix C.2.
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The results from Model HT-2 are strikingly similar to those from the cutoff model: (i)
the administrator’s preferred estimator depends on n(θ) (same as in the cutoff model), (ii)
the preferred estimator does not depend on the specific parameterization of HT-2, other
than the shape of n(θ) (same as in the cutoff model), and (iii) given n(θ), the administrator
would prefer the same estimator in the cutoff model as she would in HT-2. In sum, I find
that the preferred estimator in the cutoff model, which depends on the class size scenario
n(θ), would also be preferred in model HT-2.
This similarity is intuitive. In the cutoff model, the administrator will have a higher
value when there are fewer Type I errors, which in the hidden type model corresponds to
fewer teachers of high true quality with quality measures below the reservation signal (i.e.,
replacement costs are lower). Likewise, the administrator in the cutoff model will also have a
higher value when there are fewer Type II errors, which in the hidden type model corresponds
to fewer teachers of low true quality with quality measures above the reservation signal (i.e.,
output will be higher).
Finally, note that one could model an increase in T by decreasing χ (from the two-period
model), as replacing teachers would become relatively less costly when compared to the
future gains in output. Then, the fact that the administrator would have the same preferred
estimator for HT-2 suggests that she would also prefer the same estimator for multi-period
versions of HT-2. It is important to note that, while Model HT-2 has two periods, a similar
transformation to that done in Model HT-1 could be used to model multiple periods and
potential changes in teacher output due to experience. If an estimator was preferred in
each period then it would also be preferred when calculating the discounted value of the
administrator’s dynamic objective.
4.2 Hidden Action Model
Many teacher incentive schemes are predicated on inducing higher effort levels from teach-
ers. This section therefore presents the workhorse CARA-Normal model of moral hazard, as
developed in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), to illustrate the potential role choice of esti-
mator may play in affecting output in a hidden action setting. The solution of this model is
the same as that in Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987), which shows that the optimal contract
features an end-of-period payment linear in measured output. This section uses the exposi-
tion of Mehta (2017), which calibrates this model to quantify the potential gains resulting
from implementation of the optimal contract, using fixed effects. For convenience, I begin
by sketching the model here.
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Model Specification There is one period. The administrator has utility q − w, where
q is output and w is the wage paid to the teacher. The teacher has constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) utility −e−ξ(w−ψ(a)), where ξ is their coefficient of absolute risk-aversion
and the cost of exerting effort a is ψ(a) = γa2/2. The teacher requires an expected utility
of u to participate. Output from teacher i depends on teacher quality according to qi = θi,
where teacher quality θi = ai + νi. The term ai is the teacher’s endogenous effort level and
the error νi ∼ N (0, σ2ν) is a productivity shock common to students taught by the teacher;
ν could correspond to a teacher-classroom-specific match effect. Assume ν can be observed
by the school principal, meaning there may be a relationship between teacher quality and
class size, as in the other models. The teacher chooses a, without knowing the realization
of ν. Average output for teacher i is noisily measured according to an average test score
qˆi = qi + i = θi + i = ai + νi + i. Note that the risk-neutrality of the administrator’s
objective implies that she can solve a separate problem for each teacher.
Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that it is optimal for the administrator to pay the
teacher based on the noisy output measure using a linear contract w = β0 + β1qˆ, where β1 is
the share of measured output paid to the teacher. Note that, from the teacher’s perspective,
uncertainty comes from the composite error νi + i, which are collected as ηi. We can then
write the wage as w(a, η), where the administrator can only observe a+η. Ex-ante, teachers
face the same uncertainty about ηi.
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Substituting for output and output measure and using the result that the optimal contract
will be linear in observed output, the administrator’s problem is
max
β0,β1
Eν,η [a+ ν − w(a, η)] (9)
s.t. w(a, η) = β0 + β1(a+ η)
Eη
[−e−ξ(w(a,η)−ψ(a))] ≥ u (IR)
a ∈ arg max Eη
[−e−ξ(w(a,η)−ψ(a))], (IC)
where the individual rationality constraint (IR) ensures participation and the incentive com-
patibility constraint (IC) characterizes the teacher’s choice of action.
The teacher problem yields a unique optimal action a∗ = β1/γ by differentiating (IC)
17This section adopts the simplifying assumption that teachers treat ηi as being normally distributed when
solving for their optimal action. Technically, they should integrate over the distribution of distributions of
i if n(θ) is not constant. Simulation results confirm that ηi is approximately normally distributed for
reasonable parameter values; a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality of ηi has a p-value of 0.131. Further
note that all teachers would still have the same equilibrium action in the latter case, meaning this assumption
would not affect the qualitative predictions from this model. This assumption is, therefore, consistent with
this model’s focus on a hidden action, in contrast to the hidden type specification.
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with respect to action and the optimal linear contract features β∗1 = 1/(1 + ξγσ
2
η) (see pp.
137-139 of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for details).18 Therefore, expected output is
E [q∗] = Eν [a∗ + ν] = a∗ = 1/
(
γ(1 + ξγσ2η)
)
.19 Intuitively, as the signal quality worsens
(i.e., σ2η increases) the contract becomes lower powered (i.e., β
∗
1 decreases), resulting in lower
action a∗ and expected output E [q∗].
As with the hidden type model, it is important to understand how choice of estimator
would affect output in this environment. The fixed effects estimator would simply be the
(unadulterated) output signal, i.e., qˆFEi = qˆi. Proposition 6 considers the case of constant
class sizes.
Proposition 6. The administrator receives the same value from both estimators in Model
HA when class size is constant.
Proof. The empirical Bayes estimator would be qˆFEi shrunk by a constant factor λ, i.e.,
qˆEBi = λqˆi. If (β
∗FE
0 , β
∗FE
1 ) solves (9) when using output measure qˆ
FE
i then it must be that
(β∗FE0 , β
∗FE
1 /λ) solves (9) when using output measure λqˆi. Thus, the administrator obtains
the same value from using either estimator.
Intuitively, empirical Bayes contains the same amount of information as fixed effects when
class sizes are constant, meaning the contract slope would simply adjust to take into account
its shrunken distribution. An implication of Proposition 6 is that we can scale the empirical
Bayes estimator in Model HA to have the same variance as the fixed effects estimator. That
is, we can compare estimator performance by scaling them to have the same variance and
consider only the information they contain.
Model HA highlights the bias-variance “tradeoff” that has potentially been the source of
confusion, leading to the adoption of shrinkage estimators in many applications. If the vari-
ance of the fixed effects estimator increased, the resulting optimal contract would partially
protect a risk-averse teacher by making incentives weaker in the output measure (i.e., test
scores), or reducing the slope of the linear contract β1. The more risk-averse the teacher,
the more protected they would be (i.e., the shallower the slope β1). Crucially, the optimal
contract would not respond to an increase in noise by “changing the data” (e.g., switching
to a lower-variance estimator), but rather, would in equilibrium adjust the way in which the
data were used in remuneration (i.e., decrease β1).
18Note that, according to this model, output will necessarily be zero when teachers are salaried (i.e.,
β1 = 0), which is the case in many real-world applications in which, for various reasons, output-based pay
has not been implemented. This obviously counterfactual implication can be resolved by assuming there are
two types of effort: the action a which is only imperfectly measured and another action that is perfectly
observed, and therefore, contractible.
19Note that, although in this moral hazard setting there is a degenerate distribution of teacher effort in
equilibrium, measured teacher quality (i.e., average test score qˆ) is normally distributed.
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The fact that Proposition 6 shows we can re-scale the empirical Bayes estimator when
class size is constant suggests the use of a biased, yet lower-variance estimator could be
modeled by increasing the effective error variance σ2η. We can apply the informativeness
principal of Ho¨lmstrom (1979), which relates the value of a signal to how much information
it contains, and rank estimators based on how much information they contain about teacher
quality. I do this by examining the signal-to-noise ratio in the output measure.
Proposition 7. The administrator’s preferred estimator in Model HA depends on the rela-
tionship between teacher quality and class size.
Proof. The empirical Bayes signal is qˆEBi = λiqˆi = λiθi + λii, which has a mean amount of
signal about θ (i.e., fraction of variation explained by θ) of∫ ∞
−∞
[λ(θ)θ]2
[λ(θ)θ]2 + [λ(θ)σ(n(θ))]
2dF (θ),
where the numerator is smaller when n(θ) is negative quadratic and larger when n(θ) is
positive quadratic.
Therefore, as with the cutoff and hidden type models, the theoretical effect of switching
from empirical Bayes to fixed effects is unambiguous in the hidden action model, given the
relationship between class size and teacher quality: output would be the same with constant
class sizes, lower under empirical Bayes with a negative-quadratic n(θ), and higher under
empirical Bayes when n(θ) is positive quadratic.
5 Quantitative Results
In this section, I quantify the estimators’ performance, using data from the Los Angeles Uni-
fied School District, the second-largest school district in the US.20 In Section 5.1, I calibrate
parameters needed to compare estimator performance in the cutoff model, which is most
parsimonious. In Section 5.2, I assume the administrator wishes to categorize all teachers
in the district with respect to an array of desired cutoffs in the district-wide distribution
of teacher quality. Section 5.3 presents a back-of-the-envelope calculation of how choice of
estimator would affect output in the hidden type model. Section 5.4 discusses calibration of
the additional parameters of the hidden action model and computes how choice of estimator
would affect output there. Although these incentive schemes are not currently in place in
Los Angeles, these exercises can serve as a useful benchmark for how the estimators might
20Imberman and Lovenheim (2016) use these data in their study of the market’s valuation of value-added.
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perform when used in similar incentive schemes. Indeed, the fact that a high-stakes scheme
was not in place obviates addressing the potential strategic re-assignment of students to
teachers.
5.1 Calibration
The cutoff model shows that the difference in the administrator’s value depends on the
variances of teacher quality σ2θ and the test score measurement error σ
2
 and the relationship
between teacher quality and class size, n(θ), implying that it is necessary to obtain values
for these objects to compare the performance of the estimators.
Variances Schochet and Chiang (2012) compile estimates of the variances from a large
number of studies in their study of error rates in value-added models, providing a good
source for typical values for σ2θ and σ
2
 (see Appendix D.1). The chosen parameter values of
σ2θ = 0.046 and σ
2
 = 0.953 indicate that the variance of the measurement error is about 20
times the size of the variance of teacher quality, resulting in an average student-achievement
signal-to-noise ratio of 0.512; that is, student achievement for the average teacher in Los
Angeles is about equal parts signal and noise. This value is similar to the one used in Staiger
and Rockoff (2010). As has been noted by many other researchers studying a wide variety of
contexts (e.g., McCaffrey et al. (2009), Staiger and Rockoff (2010)), it is difficult to correctly
classify teachers.
Relationship Between Class Size and Teacher Quality I recover the relationship be-
tween class size and teacher quality using value-added estimates provided by the Los Angeles
Times. In 2011, the Los Angeles Times published the results of a RAND Corporation study
estimating value-added for over 30,000 teachers serving almost 700,000 students (Buddin
(2011)).21 The dataset contains estimated value-added, estimating using fixed-effects mod-
els, for 3rd to 5th grade teachers in both Reading and Math and class sizes which condition on
several variables, including past performance of students, class size, student characteristics
such as race, gender, English proficiency and parents education, and classroom composition
(past performance of classmates and their student characteristics as well).22 In addition
to describing the relationship between teacher quality and class size, which is critical to
compare the performance of the estimators, the distributions of value-added estimates from
21http://projects.latimes.com/value-added/
22The results do not appreciably change when using value-added estimates from specifications that control
for subsets of these characteristics.
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Buddin (2011) are similar to those in Schochet and Chiang (2012).23 The average class size
is 22.5 students, with a standard deviation of 5 students.
Figure 3 plots non-parametric regressions (solid blue lines) of class size on estimated
teacher value-added for Reading (3a) and Math (3b). Teachers at either end of the distri-
bution of Reading value-added have the smallest class sizes and those in the middle of the
distribution have the largest class sizes. Table 1 shows the results of regressions of teacher
class size on estimated teacher quality and estimated teacher quality squared. The first two
columns are for Reading and the second two are for Math. The dotted black lines on Figure
3 shows the regression line fit for models in columns (1) and (3). Columns (2) and (4) are
the same as regressions in (1) and (3), respectively, but exclude teachers whose estimated
quality is more than two standard deviations from the population mean, showing that the
estimates from the full sample are not driven by outliers. These results indicate that class
size is indeed increasing in value-added in the lowest part of the distribution and decreasing
in value-added in the highest part of the distribution. The relationship is not as clear for
math value-added, but the regression shows that class size first increases and then decreases
for reading value-added, with a negative quadratic term for math value-added. Strikingly,
the observed relationship between teacher quality and class size is the worst-case scenario
for the empirical Bayes estimator, as outlined by Proposition 2.
To most closely match the model, n(θ) would ideally be known and fed into the adminis-
trator’s problem. In practice, only estimates of n(θ), denoted by nˆ(θˆ), are directly available
from any dataset; the latter are what was presented in Table 1. The estimated relationship
nˆ(θˆ) also features a mechanical negative-quadratic relationship, caused by heteroskedastic
errors possible even under identically distributed class sizes. To address these issues, I cali-
brate n(θ) using an indirect inference approach described in Appendix D.2. Table 2 presents
the calibrated relationships between teacher quality and class size, n(θ), which are used
for the quantitative results. The first column presents the intercept, the second the linear
term, and the third the term on the quadratic variable. The negative quadratic term in the
calibrated relationship between class size and teacher quality for Reading is stronger than
that presented in Table 1, at -13.929, compared to -6.801 in column (1) of Table 1. On the
other hand, there is a negligible relationship between class size and teacher quality in Math.
That is, the mechanical relationship generated by heteroskedasticity can basically explain
the fairly weak pattern in Table 1.
23The distributions of value-added in the data have means of 6.4E-11 and 1.3E-10 and variances of 0.038
and 0.083 for Reading and Math value-added, respectively. Because the quantitative results combine data
from Buddin (2011) and parameter values calibrated from other datasets, the fact that these parameters are
similar across the two types of sources lends validity to the quantitative results.
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Table 1: Regressions of class size on teacher quality
Dependent variable: Class size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reading 0.618∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗
quality (0.139) (0.167)
Sq. Reading −6.801∗∗∗ −11.180∗∗∗
quality (0.368) (0.834)
Math 0.060 −0.008
quality (0.092) (0.109)
Sq. Math −1.014∗∗∗ −1.527∗∗∗
quality (0.212) (0.370)
Constant 22.609∗∗∗ 22.736∗∗∗ 22.434∗∗∗ 22.467∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.035) (0.032) (0.035)
Observations 36,125 34,407 36,125 34,372
R2 0.009 0.006 0.001 0.0005
F Statistic 170.442∗∗∗ 99.271∗∗∗ 11.442∗∗∗ 8.535∗∗∗
(df = 2; 36122) (df = 2; 34404) (df = 2; 36122) (df = 2; 34369)
Note: ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2: Calibrated n(θ), by subject
Subject Constant Subject quality Sq. subject quality Res. Std. Error
Reading 22.702 1.031 -13.929 5.124
Math 22.263 -0.225 -0.039 4.388
Note: Calibration details are in Appendix D.2.
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Figure 3: The relationship between class size and teacher quality
(a) Reading
18
20
22
24
26
-0.6 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6
Teacher quality, Reading
C
la
ss
si
ze
(b) Math
18
20
22
24
26
-0.5 0.0 0.5
Teacher quality, Math
C
la
ss
si
ze
5.2 Quantitative Findings: Cutoff Model
This section computes the administrator’s value from using each estimator for a wide range
of desired cutoffs, using the calibrated values of error variances and the relationship between
class size and teacher quality obtained in Section 5.1. For each desired cutoff κ and subject
(e.g., identifying teachers with quality at or above the 99th percentile for Reading value-
added), I solve for the administrator’s optimal cutoff policy for fixed-effects and empirical
Bayes estimators, assuming a symmetric loss function.24 This returns an expected objective
for each estimator, for each desired cutoff (and subject), i.e., vFECP (κ) and v
EB
CP (κ) for the
fixed-effects and empirical Bayes estimators, respectively (for Reading).
Figure 4a plots the ratio of the administrator’s maximized expected objective under the
fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators (vFECP (κ)/v
EB
CP (κ)) for Reading (solid black line)
and Math (dotted red line), for desired cutoffs ranging from the lowest to the highest teacher
qualities. The right panel (4b) plots how many more expected mistakes (i.e., the expected
sum of Type I and II errors) the empirical Bayes estimator would make than the fixed
effects estimator, assuming the Los Angeles school district employed 30,000 teachers.25 We
can see that the quadratic nature of the association between teacher quality and class size
24Results are qualitatively similar under asymmetric preferences, i.e., where α 6= 1/2; see Appendix B.3.
25The Los Angeles school district is the second-largest in the US. Though the value-added data I am using
cover 30,000 teachers, more than 45,000 worked in the district in 2007 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Los_Angeles_Unified_School_District).
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affects the relative performance of the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators in the
way demonstrated by Proposition 2. The stronger negative-quadratic relationship between
teacher quality and class size in the Reading test causes the larger divergence between the
value of using fixed effects rather than empirical Bayes estimators. The administrator’s
value is higher almost everywhere when she uses the fixed effects estimator, and the relative
performance of the empirical Bayes estimator is the worst at the extremes of the distribution
of teacher quality. For example, the empirical Bayes estimator would make almost 800 more
mistakes than fixed effects when the desired cutoff is at the 1st percentile, and 600 more when
the desired cutoff is at the 99th percentile. Put another way, even when the administrator is
allowed to re-optimize and choose an estimator-specific cutoff policy, using empirical Bayes
would result in 9.5% more classification mistakes when the desired cutoff was at the 1st
percentile of teacher quality and 7.3% more mistakes when the desired cutoff was the 99th
percentile of teacher quality.26 The administrator’s values from using the fixed effects and
empirical Bayes estimators become comparable as the desired cutoff approaches the center of
the distribution of teacher quality. The performance of the fixed effects and empirical Bayes
estimators most greatly diverges precisely where policies that sanction very low-performing
teachers or reward very high-performing teachers would bite the most, and the fixed effects
estimator returns higher expected maximized utility (i.e., in expectation would make fewer
mistakes) under almost every desired cutoff.
The divergence in estimator performance is largest when the desired cutoff is in the tails
of true teacher quality. However, all teachers would be affected by the administrator’s choice
of estimator. Figure 5a plots the probability that a teacher with true quality θ, measured
along the x-axis, has an estimated quality θˆ above the optimal cutoff policy corresponding
to a desired cutoff κ of the first percentile of true teacher quality (dotted black line), e.g.,
Pr{θˆFE ≥ c∗FE} for the fixed effects estimator. This desired cutoff could correspond to firing
teachers with quality at or below the first percentile. These probabilities are plotted for
the fixed effects (solid red line) and empirical Bayes (dashed blue line) estimators, using the
relationship between class size and teacher quality for Reading. The shaded area corresponds
to teachers with true quality below the desired cutoff. Having an estimated quality above
c∗ for teachers in this region would mean the administrator made a Type II error, e.g., they
were incorrectly retained, the probability of which corresponds to the distance from the
estimator-specific curve to 1 in Figure 5a. For teachers outside the shaded region, having an
estimated quality below c∗ would correspond to a Type I error, e.g., they were incorrectly
dismissed, the probability of which corresponds to the height of the estimator-specific curve.
26The fraction of classification mistakes when using fixed effects when the desired cutoff κ is the 1st and
99th percentile would be 27.8% and 27.1%, respectively.
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Figure 4: Administrator’s value and difference in mistakes, using calibrated n(θ)
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Note: Number of decisions is 30,000.
For each estimator, the probability of having estimated quality above the optimal cutoff
policy increases as a teacher’s true quality increases (i.e., we move to the right). However,
the fixed effects estimator has a higher probability of measuring above-threshold teachers
as above c∗FE than does empirical Bayes for its corresponding optimal cutoff policy and a
lower probability of measuring below-threshold teachers as above c∗FE. That is, fixed effects
would have lower probabilities of both Type I and Type II errors. This is more clear in Figure
5b, which plots the ratio of probability of the estimate being above the respective cutoff for
fixed effects over empirical Bayes, i.e., Pr{θˆFE ≥ c∗FE}/Pr{θˆEB ≥ c∗EB}. For example, fixed
effects would have a 40% lower chance of measuring a teacher with true quality more than
four standard deviations below the mean (θ ≈ −0.8)—well below the desired cutoff quality of
the first percentile—as above the optimal cutoff policy and a 10% higher chance of finding a
teacher with true quality about 1.5 sd below the mean (θ ≈ −0.3)—above the desired cutoff
quality—as above the cutoff policy. More generally, teachers over a large range of quality
would be differentially affected by the estimator—that is, the impacts are not limited only
to those in the extreme tails of the quality distribution.
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Figure 5: Probability of being measured above optimal cutoff policy, given F−1(κ) = 0.01
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5.3 Quantitative Findings: Hidden Type Model
Although the cutoff-based model has an intuitive outcome space—the probability of correct
classification—it would also be of interest to gauge how choice of estimator would affect
output. We can also use the calibrated relationship between teacher quality and class size to
form a rough idea of how moving to an output-based retention policy would affect outcomes
if we had information about the replacement cost χ.
I use Model HT-2 to get a rough idea for how much the choice of estimator affects output.
I computed output under Model HT-2 (i.e., HT-0 with nonconstant n(θ)) under fixed effects
and empirical Bayes estimators using the calibrated Reading class size relationship from
Table 2 and a calibrated replacement cost value of χ = 0.25σθ = 0.054. I chose this value for
χ because Wiswall (2013) reports that teachers with 30 years of experience have value-added
that is one standard deviation higher than new teachers and 0.75 standard deviations higher
than teachers with five years of experience, implying a 0.25 standard deviation difference
acquired in the first five years of experience. This value is similar to that used in Staiger and
Rockoff (2010), who assume a first-year teacher has an average value-added 0.07 sd lower
than teachers with two or more years of experience. Note that by setting χ in terms of
standard deviations of teacher quality, the outcome is naturally viewed in terms of teacher
quality, which has been shown to appreciably affect economic output (Hanushek (2011)).
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Expected output when using empirical Bayes and the optimal reservation signal policy
q∗EB(χ, n(θ)), is 0.058; teachers with quality measures in the bottom 36% would be replaced
That is, second-period teacher quality from using empirical Bayes would be 5.8% of a stan-
dard deviation larger than it would be in a world where all teachers were retained. Expected
teacher quality, and hence, output, from using fixed effects would be 0.11% larger. If instead,
we used the value χ = 0.07 from Staiger and Rockoff (2010), the reservation signal would
be lower, in response to the larger replacement cost; here, teachers with the lowest 32%
signals would be replaced. Expected teacher quality in the second period would be 5.6% of
a standard deviation larger when using empirical Bayes than it would be in a world where
all teachers were retained, and 0.22% larger under fixed effects than when using empirical
Bayes.
5.4 Quantitative Findings: Hidden Action Model
As with the hidden type environment, it would be useful to get even a rough sense of how
measurement issues affect output in the real world in a hidden action environment, by using a
tractable model and realistic values for model parameters, including the relationship between
class size and teacher quality.
Therefore, this section takes two approaches to roughly examine how choice of estimator
might affect optimal output in a hidden action environment. First, it uses estimates from
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) to calibrate parameters from the hidden action
model. Second it computes the effect on output from using either estimator of teacher
quality for a wide range of model primitives. The approaches use the relationship between
class size and teacher quality for Reading, from Section 5.127 and yield similar findings
regarding the increase in output coming from the administrator’s use of fixed effects, instead
of empirical Bayes. Note that, in each approach, actions and output are measured relative
to their baseline level, i.e., that provided by teachers absent output-based incentives.
In the hidden action model, output is a function of the action, which itself depends on the
variance of noise η, CARA parameter ξ, and cost parameter γ. I first characterize how much
information the administrator can extract about teacher quality (here, teacher effort choices)
using either estimator. I do this by calibrating the implied variance of the composite error η
for the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators (details are in Appendix D.3).28 Based
on Proposition 7, I model the information loss when using empirical Bayes under a negative
27The negligible relationship between teacher quality and class size for Math (see Table 2), when combined
with Proposition 6, obviates having to solve the model to compare estimator performance.
28This exercise abstracts from the error introduced by class size uncertainty, which would understate the
gain in output from using fixed effects instead of empirical Bayes.
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quadratic relationship between class size and teacher quality by increasing the measurement
error variance on teacher action, σ2η, by 3.2%.
29
Mehta (2017) uses data from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), which estimates
the effect of a linear output-based incentive scheme for teachers in the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh, and other information to calibrate the model parameters (γ, ξ, σ2η). These are then
used to characterize the optimal contract when using the fixed effects estimator and the
gains from implementing the optimal contract, which at the calibrated parameters would be
over six times larger than those in Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011). Here, I take
that calibration as given and compute the effect of using the empirical Bayes estimator on
equilibrium output under the optimal contract.
Briefly, Mehta (2017) exploits the teacher’s optimal choice of action, which solves (IC)
in (9) but does not rely on optimality of the slope β1, to map (β1, a) to the cost γ =
4.385× 10−5. The CARA parameter is set to ξ = 6.7× 10−3, the mean estimated CARA
from the benchmark model of Cohen and Einav (2007), Table 5. Finally, the variance of
output is calibrated to σ2η =6,076,631$
2. At the calibrated parameters, the optimal slope
is β∗FE1 = 0.483, which has a corresponding optimal action of a
∗FE = $11, 011.34; this
corresponds to an average increase in student achievement of 0.919 sd. Either increase is
more than six times larger than the estimated increase in student achievement stemming
from the much weaker incentives provided under the experiment.
In contrast, using the above reckoning that empirical Bayes increases the variance of η by
3.2%, using empirical Bayes would produce an optimal slope of β∗EB1 = 0.475 and optimal
action of a∗EB = $10, 832.07, i.e., a 0.904 sd average increase in student achievement. As
expected, the higher measurement error variance on output from using empirical Bayes would
lower the strength of incentives (i.e., slope) and resulting equilibrium action. Output would
be 1.65% higher under fixed effects than it would be under empirical Bayes, suggesting an
obvious choice of fixed effects for education policymakers. Naturally, we would expect the
results from the hidden type model to be smaller than those from hidden action model here,
as the hidden type model primarily affects output at the low end of the teacher quality
distribution, while the hidden action model would affect output for all teachers.
Sensitivity Analysis Via Parameter Grid The mean class size in the Los Angeles
data is 22.5, much smaller than the mean of 37.5 used in the above calibration. Smaller
class sizes would increase the variance of the output measure. Moreover, Dohmen and
Falk (2010) document that teachers are more risk-averse than other workers. Therefore,
29Of course, it would be in principle possible to also directly condition on class size. However, as has
been discussed previously, this would introduce a direct incentive to manipulate class size to affect the
administrator’s posterior beliefs about teacher quality.
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it would seem reasonable to examine how estimator-specific output would be affected by
varying the parameters of the hidden action model. Mehta (2017) does this for a grid of
points covering a wide range of alternative values of σ2η and ξ, ranging from one half to ten
times the calibrated value of each parameter.30 Briefly, as teachers become more risk averse
(increasing ξ) or the output measure becomes noisier (increasing σ2η), both optimal incentive
strength and output would decrease. For example, the increase in output ranges from over
1.5 sd in student achievement to around 0.5 sd when teachers are ten times more risk averse
than their calibrated value of ξ = 6.7e − 3; this latter figure is only about three times the
estimated effect of the incentive scheme.
As interesting as these results may be in their own right, the goal here is to quantify the
difference in output stemming from using one estimator versus another. Figure 6 presents a
contour maps of the ratio in optimal output from using fixed effects over that using empirical
Bayes. Although, as just discussed, optimal incentive strength and output gains vary con-
siderably with respect to σ2η and ξ, the output gain associated with using fixed effects versus
empirical Bayes ranges from just above 1% to around 3%. Intuitively, the higher noise in
empirical Bayes matters more (relative to the cost γ) when teachers are more risk averse or
when the baseline variance on the shock to output is higher. Of course, we cannot know the
exact amount by which the output would be lower were the administrator to use empirical
Bayes; knowing this would require the development and estimation of a richer structural
model, a promising avenue for future research. However, the variable share of compensation,
calculated in Mehta (2017), can provide further guidance. As with the slope and output,
this share declines as the output noise variance and degree of risk aversion increase. Suppose
it seemed reasonable that, in the optimal arrangement, the variable share of compensation
for teachers would be at most around 2% of their income. Then the gain in output from
switching from empirical Bayes to fixed effects would be about 2-3%, which is even larger
than it was at the calibrated parameter values.
6 Discussion
While economic theory can help inform education policy, measurement issues are also impor-
tant when considering how to actually use data. Due to their statistical properties, empirical
Bayes estimators of teacher value-added are used by many education researchers and prac-
30Table 2 in Babcock et al. (1993) shows that a higher-end estimate of ξ is about 0.35, well above the
range considered in the parameter grid here. The output loss from using empirical Bayes would be larger
for CARA parameters in that range. Note that, because γ was recovered using the teacher’s optimal action
choice and can be recovered by using the slope of incentives in the experiment and increase in output, it
does not depend on (σ2η, ξ) and is therefore fixed.
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Figure 6: Ratio of optimal output,
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titioners to make inferences about teacher quality, which may serve as inputs to high-stakes
decisions like bonus assignments, personnel decisions, or wages. More generally, shrinkage
estimators are used on a broad array of policy-relevant applications. It is not obvious this
should be the case. If an estimator is going to be used to make a decision, then studies
of its bias and other statistical properties are certainly useful, but as an intermediate—not
final—step in their evaluation.
In this paper, I show that the preferred estimator depends on information that is plau-
sibly part of an administrator’s context. The preferred estimator would be the same for
wide ranges of underlying parameters for all the models considered and is determined by
the relationship between class size and teacher quality. Because it is possible to compute
the preferred estimator without knowing the specific parameterization of the relevant model,
this approach answers a different type of question than one quantifying the effects of poten-
tially suboptimal policies using estimated models (e.g., Stinebrickner (2001), Tincani (2012),
Todd and Wolpin (2012), Behrman et al. (2016)) or those with calibrated parameters (e.g.,
Rothstein (2014)).
I find that class size is negative quadratic with respect to teacher quality in the Los
Angeles Unified School District, the second-largest district in the United States. Suppose
an administrator had been using empirical Bayes in an incentive scheme. Would it make
sense to switch to fixed effects? The relevant comparison, from an economic perspective, is a
cost-benefit one. It is important to note that the intervention considered in this paper is very
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easy to implement and virtually costless—to use a different, more transparent estimator of
teacher quality—and that the preferred estimator would be the same across several models of
the administrator’s objective. Indeed, in all likelihood, the relative cost of using fixed effects
would be zero, or even negative, given the increased transparency of fixed effects, which could
translate to a lower nonpecuniary cost incurred by society. Then, by an economic criterion,
these results suggest an obvious benefit from using fixed effects instead of empirical Bayes in
the design of teacher incentive schemes if, as was suggested previously, class size is negative
quadratic in teacher quality in the relevant context. Administrators hesitant to implement
incentive schemes may take comfort in at least knowing schemes were better-designed for
their purposes, reducing the change of public backlash. It is important to note that the results
are not just driven by the econometric endogeneity misspecification (i.e., class sizes that are
negative quadratic in teacher quality). Absent this econometric endogeneity, empirical Bayes
would still not return a higher value to the administrator, as uniform shrinkage would be
undone by the administrator’s re-optimization.
This paper characterizes which estimator would be preferred by an administrator in an
extremely large school district that has recently received much policy interest (such as that
created by the Los Angeles Times release of the value-added estimates used here). A study
of how best to estimate teacher quality for another context would require data from the
relevant geography and, to prescribe the optimal policy, information about the administra-
tor’s preferences. However, the uniform nature of the preferred estimator across the variety
of environments studied in this paper suggests that a policymaker in another district could
choose the right estimator for their context with a certain degree of confidence. Important
future work would study optimal design of incentive schemes using a more general produc-
tion technology model relating economic output to teacher quality, such as one allowing for
cumulative effects of inputs in a dynamic setting.
This paper’s findings could also in principle be applied to other work studying how to
structure incentives and personnel decisions based on noisy output measures. For example,
findings from the cutoff model could potentially be applied to decisionmakers in other settings
that discrete policies (e.g., Rubin (1980), who uses empirical Bayes to study law school
admissions decisions). The insights from this paper could also apply to other deviations
from the statistical framework considered in this paper. For example, a biased estimator may
be preferred in the cutoff model if higher-quality teachers were known to be systematically
assigned unobservably better students, as this would dilate quality measures and make it
easier to identify teachers of interest. Although deriving the (fully) optimal estimator for
the environments considered in this paper is a technically difficult problem, future research
making progress in this area could also quantify the effects of using such an estimator.
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Motivated by the quantitative results showing the choice of estimator can create dif-
ferences in policy-relevant outcomes, I have reviewed existing incentive schemes, which are
summarized in Appendix A. Most of the schemes use cutoff rules to assign bonuses and more
than half base bonuses, in part, on value-added models of student achievement. Almost 90%
of these use empirical Bayes estimators to calculate teacher quality. Strikingly, about one-
fifth of the schemes do not even specify how student achievement is mapped into teacher
bonuses. A corollary of this paper’s results is that, because the choice of estimator matters,
teacher incentive programs should clearly specify exactly how student achievement enters
them.
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Appendix
A Teacher Incentive Schemes
Table 3 documents existing teacher incentive schemes that are based, at least in part, on
student achievement. Many of these schemes include estimates of value-added as a determi-
nant of teacher bonuses, and most that do base bonuses on value-added also include other
measures of teacher quality.
Table 3: Incentive pay schemes
Name of scheme Location Active dates Bonus schedule Uses value-added ? Uses EB?
Dallas Independent School
District (DISD) Principal
and Teacher Incentive Pay
program
Dallas, Texas 2007-08 school
year (Previ-
ous program
started in
1992)
Discrete Yes Yes
TVAAS Tennessee Since 1996 Discrete Yes Yes
Tennessee Educator Accel-
eration Model (TEAM)
Tennessee Since 2010 Discrete Yes Yes
Memphis’ Teacher Effec-
tiveness Measure (TEM)
Memphis, Tennessee Since 2010 Discrete Yes Yes
Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Since 2013-
2014
Discrete Yes Yes
Pittsburgh Pittsburgh Since 2013-
2014
Discrete Yes Yes
North Carolina Teacher
Evaluation Process
North Carolina since 2012-2013 Discrete Yes Yes
Mission Possible Guilford County,
North Carolina
2006-current Discrete Yes Yes
Milken Family Founda-
tion’s Teacher Advance-
ment Program (TAP)
Nationwide (125
schools in 9 states
and 50 districts as of
2007)
Since 1999 Discrete Yes Varies
Denver Public School’s
Professional Compensa-
tion System for Teachers
(ProComp)
Denver, Colorado Since 2005 Discrete (many bonus
levels)
No No
Special Teachers Are Re-
warded (STAR) (followed
by MAP)
Florida 2006-2007
(MAP since
2007)
Discrete (MAP has
both continuous and
discrete rewards)
No (though they do use
a discretized version of
value-added through a
value table)
No
North Carolina ABCs North Carolina 1996-2012 Discrete No No
Q-Comp Minnesota Since 2005 Varies, but mostly
discrete
Varies between partici-
pants, but unknown in
general.
?
Louisiana Louisiana Since 2010 Discrete ? ?
Texas’ Governor’s Educa-
tor Excellence Award Pro-
grams (GEEAP)
Texas 2008 school
year
? ? ?
Source: Author’s compilation.
B Cutoff Model Proofs and Extensions
B.1 Direct Conditioning on Class Size
The difference in administrator’s value from using different teacher-quality estimators de-
rives from the assumption that the administrator chooses a cutoff policy based on only test
score information. Such a one-dimensional policy is quite simple and, therefore, is of con-
siderable clear policy relevance; this demonstrated by Table 3, which documents existing
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incentive schemes and shows that none condition on class size, among incentivized teach-
ers. Additionally, when compared with a policy that may also explicitly condition on class
sizes, a test-score-based cutoff may attenuate issues of class size manipulation for the sake
of affecting the administrator’s posterior about the quality of a particular teacher. However,
allowing the administrator to explicitly take into account class size is of theoretical interest.
Therefore, this section shows how the theoretical results in Section 3 would be affected.
Now suppose the administrator, instead of only indirectly taking it into account when
maximizing her utility, could instead explicitly condition on class size ni. If ni was a strictly
monotonic function of teacher quality θ then the administrator could achieve a perfect clas-
sification of teachers by inverting n(θ)—even if she ignored all teachers’ test scores. A more
realistic case is where there are multiple teacher qualities for at least one class size. Suppose
that the distribution of teacher qualities for each class size is normally distributed. Note
that, because she can explicitly condition on class size, she can hold a separate cutoff-based
classification problem for each class size level; denote the administrator’s value from using
the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators as vFECP,n(κ) and v
EB
CP,n(κ), respectively. Then
by Proposition 1 the administrator would obtain the same value for either estimator given
the desired cutoff κ, i.e., vFECP,n(κ) = v
EB
CP,n(κ) for all (n, κ). Therefore, we can without loss of
generality consider only the fixed-effects estimator, with optimal cutoff policy c∗FEn . Further
note that the administrator’s expected objective would be at least as high if she is allowed to
split her original objective into one objective for each class size; if the cutoff for c∗FEn1 = c
∗FE
n2
for all class sizes n1, n2, then her value under the separate class size scheme is the same as
that from her original objective.
B.2 Administrator’s Problem with Infinite Precision
We want to prove that as the variance of the measurement error tends to 0 (which implies
σ → 0) all teachers will be correctly categorized, giving vFECP (κ) = vEBCP (κ) = 1 for all desired
κ. First, consider the fixed effects estimator. The administrator’s utility for a teacher with
true quality θ under estimator θˆ and cutoff policy c is
uCP (θ, θˆ; c, κ) = α1{θˆ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ}+ (1− α)1{θˆ < c ∩ θ < κ} p→ α1{θ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ}+ (1− α)1{θ < c ∩ θ < κ},
(10)
which is maximized at c = κ. The administrator’s utility from using empirical Bayes
estimator for the same teacher is
plimσ→0uCP (θ, θˆ; c, κ) = α1{θ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ}+ (1− α)1{θ < c ∩ θ < κ}
= α1{λ(θ)θ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ}+ (1− α)1{λ(θ)θ < c ∩ θ < κ}, (11)
38
which is maximized at c = κ/λ(F−1(κ)). The probabilities of the events in both (10) and
(11) are all 1, giving an expected utility of 1 for all teacher qualities, which then integrates
to a value of 1 for each estimator.
B.3 Asymmetric Type I and Type II Weights
The administrator’s preferred estimator is not sensitive to the assumption that α is close to
1/2. Figure 7 plots the ratio of the administrator’s value under fixed effects and empirical
Bayes, by class size scenario n(θ) and desired cutoff κ, for different values of the Type I
error weight. Figure 7a shows the ratio in administrator’s value when α = 1/4, or the
administrator values Type I errors one-third as much as she values Type II errors. Figure 7b
shows the same ratio for when α = 2/3, i.e., the administrator values Type I errors twice as
much as Type II errors. In both plots, we can see that the relative ranking of the estimators
is the same as it was under the symmetric weight, α = 1/2, scenario.
Figure 7: Difference between administrator’s value under fixed effects and empirical Bayes,
by class size scenario and desired cut point and weight on Type I error, α
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B.4 Proposition 8
This section proves that fixed effects and empirical Bayes return the same value when the
administrator’s problem is symmetric.
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Definition 1. The administrator’s problem is symmetric if α = 1/2, n(θ) is symmetric
around the population mean of teacher quality, and the administrator’s desired cutoff is
κ = 0.
Proposition 8. The administrator receives the same value from both estimators when the
problem is symmetric.
Proof. Because n(θ) is symmetric about θ = 0 and θi ∼ F = N (0, σ2θ), the distribution of θ
is symmetric around its population mean of 0. The optimal c∗EB solves∫ ∞
0
1
λ(n(θ))σ(n(θ))
φ
(
c∗EB/λ(n(θ))− θ
σ(n(θ))
)
φ(θ/σθ)dθ =
∫ 0
−∞
1
λ(n(θ))σ(n(θ))
φ
(
c∗EB/λ(n(θ))− θ
σ(n(θ))
)
φ(θ/σθ)dθ.
At c∗EB = 0, the expression becomes∫ ∞
0
1
λ(n(θ))σ(n(θ))
φ
( −θ
σ(n(θ))
)
φ(θ/σθ)dθ =
∫ 0
−∞
1
λ(n(θ))σ(n(θ))
φ
( −θ
σ(n(θ))
)
φ(θ/σθ)dθ,
which holds because of the symmetry of φ(·), n(·), and λ(·) (through its dependence on
n, which is symmetric). Therefore, c∗EB = 0 solves the administrator’s problem when
empirical Bayes is used. Because λ(n(θ)) = 1, ∀θ when the fixed effects estimator is used,
c∗FE = 0 must also solve the administrator’s problem when fixed effects is used, meaning
the administrator’s objective is equivalent under both estimators.
C Extensions to Hidden Type Model HT-0
C.1 Model HT-1
Now allow T > 2 and let output depend on teacher experience xi(j,t),t according to qjit =
β0 + θi(j,t) + e(xi(j,t),t), where e(xit) represents output, net of β0 and teacher quality, for a
teacher with t− 1 periods of prior experience.
The optimal hiring policy ψh is unchanged. Consider the retention decision for teachers
in period t = T , for teachers with the same experience, xit = xt. Such a policy need
not only apply to teachers’ first years of experience; Wiswall (2013) shows that teacher
quality also changes after the first few years of experience. Let qˆHit be the sample mean
of teacher i’s output signals realized before period t. The retention decision ψr still has a
reservation value property, which now depends on the mean of each teacher’s entire history of
signals, qˆHit , where the threshold now depends on the period, i.e., qt = µ−
(
χ+e(xt)
ρt
)
, where
ρt = σ
2
θ/(σ
2
θ +
σ2
n|Ht|). The reservation signal qt is decreasing in xt if there are productivity
gains to experience and increasing in ρt, due to the higher precision about teachers’ true
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quality. Note that solution to this problem would be the same as that from HT-0, setting the
replacement cost (in HT-0) to χt ≡ χ+ e(xt) and using the relevant ρt, and that considering
instead periods t < T would change the desired threshold quality, which could be modeled
by suitably adjusting the replacement cost χ from the static model HT-0. Therefore, this
sequence of per-period reservation signals can then be mapped to the cutoff-based model
via a sequence of cutoff-based problems, one for each period of experience, as was done for
Model HT-0. Also, note that a similar transformation to the one above could be performed
to adapt Model HT-2 (see Section C.2) to also allow for an effect of experience on output.
C.2 Model HT-2
This model augments HT-0 to allow class size to depend on teacher quality, i.e., ni = n(θ). As
in HT-0, consider the administrator’s problem in the second period. As in the cutoff model,
the administrator must now integrate over the distribution of class sizes when choosing their
reservation signal, meaning (7) must be adapted to obtain the administrator’s value from
using fixed effects:
vFEHT2(χ) = max
qFE
(∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
qFE − θ
σ(n(θ))
)
dF (θ)
)
(−χ)
+
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1− Φ
(
qFE − θ
σ(n(θ))
)) σ2θ
σθˆFE(n(θ))
φ
(
−qFE/σθˆFE(n(θ))
)
Φ
(
−qFE/σθˆFE(n(θ))
)
 dF (θ),
(12)
where σθˆFE(n(θ)) =
√
σ2θ + σ
2
/n(θ) and σ(n(θ)) is as defined on page 9. The administrator’s
value from using the empirical Bayes estimator is
vEBHT2(χ) = max
qEB
(∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
qEB/λ(n(θ))− θ
σ(n(θ))
)
dF (θ)
)
(−χ)
+
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1− Φ
(
qEB/λ(n(θ))− θ
σ(n(θ))
)) σ2θ
σθˆFE(n(θ))
φ
(
−qEB/
(
λ(n(θ))σθˆFE(n(θ))
))
Φ
(
−qEB/
(
λ(n(θ))σθˆFE(n(θ))
))
 dF (θ).
(13)
Because n(θ) is no longer constant, as it was in HT-0, the reliability of signals varies
by teacher and the analytical characterization of the administrator’s reservation signal from
Model HT-0 no longer obtains. However, as long as the MLRP holds, higher signal realiza-
tions will cause the administrator to revise her belief about teacher quality upwards, meaning
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Proposition 3 would still apply here. The estimator-specific reservation signals, q∗FE and
q∗EB, are respectively obtained by numerically solving (12) and (13).
The ranking of the administrator’s utility from HT-2, by class size scenario n(θ), is the
same as her ranking under the cutoff-based model.
Proposition 9. In Model HT2, the administrator’s preferred estimator depends on the re-
lationship between teacher quality and class size.
Proof. As in the cutoff model, set σ = 1, which does not drive the result,
31 and parameterize
the empirical Bayes weights via
λ(θ) =
δ− + β−θ if θ < 0δ+ + β+θ if θ ≥ 0;
also set σθˆFE(n(θ)) = σθ = 1 to simplify exposition, resulting in the administrator’s value
vEBHT2(χ) =
(∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
q∗EB/λ(n(θ))− θ) dF (θ)) (−χ)
+
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1− Φ (q∗EB/λ(n(θ))− θ)) φ (−q∗EB/ (λ(n(θ))))
Φ
(−q∗EB/ (λ(n(θ))))dF (θ). (14)
Note that q∗EB < 0 if χ > 0, leading us to examine the role played by β−. Differentiating
with respect to β−, we obtain
∂vEBHT2(χ)
∂β−
=− χ
∫ 0
−∞
q∗EBθ
(δ− + β−θ)2
φ
(
q∗EB/(δ− + β−θ)− θ
)
dF (θ|θ < 0)
−
∫ 0
−∞
q∗EBθ
(δ− + β−θ)2
φ
(
q∗EB/(δ− + β−θ)− θ
) φ (−q∗EB/ (δ− + β−θ))
Φ
(−q∗EB/ (δ− + β−θ))dF (θ|θ < 0)
+
∫ 0
−∞
(
1− Φ (q∗EB/(δ− + β−θ)− θ)) ∂
[
φ(−q∗EB/(δ−+β−θ))
Φ(−q∗EB/(δ−+β−θ))
]
∂β−
dF (θ|θ < 0) (15)
because
∂vEBHT2
∂q∗EB ×
∂q∗EB
∂β−
= 0 due to the Envelope Theorem. The first line is negative be-
cause χ > 0 and q∗EBθ > 0. The second line includes the Inverse Mills Ratio term
φ(−q∗EB/(δ−+β−θ))
Φ(−q∗EB/(δ−+β−θ)) , i.e., the expected value of θ given the signal was above the reservation
value. Therefore, the second line is also negative. The third line contains
∂
[
φ(−q∗EB/(δ−+β−θ))
Φ(−q∗EB/(δ−+β−θ))
]
∂β−
.
To evaluate the sign of this expression, note that limχ→0 q∗EB = 0 and consider a very small
value of χ (allowing us to abstract from changes in q∗EB) and a large, positive, β−, which
would shrink measured quality toward zero by a larger amount, the lower true quality was.
31Details are available upon request.
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Since we are considering β−, the differential shrinkage would exclusively be coming from true
qualities below the reservation value; intuitively, having a signal above q∗EB is not as good
news about underlying quality when β− > 0. If we instead decreased β−, then higher signals
would be better news about the corresponding expected output; therefore, this derivative will
also be negative. Putting this together, the derivative of administrator value with respect
to β− is negative, meaning that a negative quadratic n(θ) would result in the administrator
preferring fixed effects and a positive quadratic relationship would have the administrator
prefer empirical Bayes.
Note that the reservation policy is decreasing in χ. For very large replacement costs,
which correspond to low q∗EB, the third line may be positive since differential shrinkage
toward the population mean would now comprise better news about underlying quality.
Therefore, I numerically solve for the value according to each estimator for a wide range of
replacement costs and under different class size scenarios: constant, negative quadratic, and
positive quadratic.32 Figure 8 shows how the relationship between class size and teacher
quality would affect outcomes in HT-2. The left panel, Figure 8a, plots the ratio in her value
from using the FE over the EB estimator. The constant class size scenario (dotted black
line) represents a special case of HT-2 where n(θ) = n. Unsurprisingly, then, we obtain the
same value for all replacement costs χ, as this is simply model HT-0. Under the negative
quadratic scenario (dot-dashed blue line) the administrator would obtain higher value from
using fixed effects for every χ. This is exactly the same result as was obtained for different
desired cutoffs (and Type I and II error weights; see Appendix B.3) under the cutoff-based
model. Also, as in the cutoff-based model, the estimator ranking is reversed under the
positive-quadratic class size scenario (dashed red line); i.e., she would prefer to use empirical
Bayes instead of fixed effects.
The right panel, Figure 8b, plots expected output under the administrator’s optimal
program for each estimator and replacement cost. As expected, the difference in estimator
performance when class size is not constant increases even more in replacement cost, as the
output measure does not take χ into account. Intuitively, retaining teachers with true quality
above a certain desired threshold—which depends on the replacement cost χ—is similar to
correctly identifying teachers with true quality above a particular desired cutoff κ in the
cutoff model (i.e., not making a Type I error). Unlike the cutoff model, in the hidden type
models, the administrator faces the same (replacement) cost for obtaining new teachers; that
32Wiswall (2013) reports that teachers with 30 years of experience have value-added that is one standard
deviation higher than new teachers and 0.75 standard deviations higher than teachers with five years of
experience; this implies a 0.25 sd difference acquired in the first five years of experience. Therefore, I set
χ = 0.25σθ = 0.054 and then use a range for the replacement cost running from zero to 0.10, approximately
twice this value.
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is, the cost portion of her objective does not directly depend on teachers’ true quality θ.
As with model HT-1, an environment with multiple periods could be modeled by suit-
ably adjusting the desired threshold quality. For example, adding more periods could be
accommodated by decreasing the replacement cost, as the administrator would have a rela-
tively higher gain from replacing when there are more periods of output. Because they range
from a cost of zero to twice the estimated difference in value-added between a teacher with
five years experience and no experience, the calculations presented in Figure 8 then likely
encompass costs for multi-period environments as well.
Figure 8: Difference between administrator’s value under fixed effects and empirical Bayes,
by class size scenario and replacement cost χ
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(b) Ratio of period-2 output, FE/EB
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The takeaway from this section is that (i) the administrator’s preferred estimator depends
on the class size scenario n(θ), (ii) though the difference in values from using either estimator
depends on other model parameters (T, χ), the preferred estimator does not, and (iii) the
administrator would prefer the same estimator in HT-2 as she would in the cutoff model.
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D Details for Quantitative Exercises
D.1 Calibrated Error Variances
I calibrate σ2θ and σ
2
 from Table B-2 of Schochet and Chiang (2012) normalizing the total
variance to one. To most closely match a policy where an administrator would like to rank
teachers across a school district, I calibrate σ2θ = 0.046 by summing the average of school-
and teacher-level variances in random effects. To most closely approximate an environment
where both student and aggregate-level shocks may affect student test scores, I calibrate
σ2 = 0.953 by summing the average of class- and student-level variances in random effects.
Note that, due to the much greater student-level error variance, the approximate sizes of σ2θ
and σ2 are approximately the same if school-level variances are excluded from σ
2
θ or class-level
variances are excluded from σ2 , lending robustness to the quantitative findings.
D.2 Heteroskedasticity Correction for Relationship Between Class
Size and Teacher Quality
The advantage of the indirect inference approach is that it can be implemented using a
vector of auxiliary moments which do not necessarily correspond to structural econometric
parameters. This is useful in the current context where the micro-data to directly correct
for heteroskedasticity are not available.33
Indirect Inference Algorithm The following is done separately for Reading and Math.
0. Estimate the relationship between class size (ni) and teacher i’s estimated quality
in the subject (θˆi) by running the regression ni = β
data
0 + β
data
1 θˆi + β
data
2 (θˆi)
2 + ei.
The regression coefficients
(
βˆdata0 , βˆ
data
1 , βˆ
data
2
)
and residual standard error σˆdatae form
the first set auxiliary parameters to fit. Compute the 25th, 50th, and 75th per-
centiles of the empirical distribution of class sizes, (ndatap25 , n
data
p50 , n
data
p75 ). These are the
remaining auxiliary parameters. The target vector of auxiliary parameters is then(
βˆdata0 , βˆ
data
1 , βˆ
data
2 , σˆe
data, ndatap25 , n
data
p50 , n
data
p75
)
.
1. Given σ2θ , simulate teacher quality θ
sim
i once for each teacher in the sample. (Recall
the population mean has been normalized to 0).
2. Simulate the random component of class sizes nsimi,i.i.d, which is distributed normal with
mean zero and standard deviation σnsim . As described below, this algorithm chooses
33If micro-data had been available, then one could in principle use an approach like the one in Lockwood
and McCaffrey (2014) to account for the nonlinearities produced by heteroskedastic errors.
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the parameter σnsim . Note these are independent from teacher quality to get an idea
of the role heteroskedasticity plays.
3. Assign incremental class sizes according to ninc(θsimi ) = a0 + a1θ
sim
i + a2(θ
sim
i )
2. As
described below, this algorithm chooses the parameters (a0, a1, a2). The final simulated
class size for teacher i is then nsimi = round{nsimi,i.i.d + ninc(θsimi )}, i.e., class sizes are
integer-valued.
4. Given σ2 and n
sim
i simulate an average shock for each teacher, 
sim
i ; form simulated
estimated teacher quality according to θˆsimi = θ
sim
i + 
sim
i .
5. Regress nsimi = β
sim
0 + β
sim
1 θˆ
sim
i + β
sim
2 (θˆ
sim
i )
2, estimating the auxiliary coefficients
(βˆsim0 , βˆ
sim
1 , βˆ
sim
2 ) and auxiliary residual standard error σˆ
sim
e . Compute the 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentiles of the simulated distribution of class sizes, (nsimp25 , n
sim
p50 , n
sim
p75 ). The
simulated vector of auxiliary parameters is then
(
βˆsim0 , βˆ
sim
1 , βˆ
sim
2 , σˆ
sim
e , n
sim
p25 , n
sim
p50 , n
sim
p75
)
.
6. Compute the Euclidean distance between target auxiliary parameters and simulated
auxiliary parameters (e.g., βˆdata0 and βˆ
sim
0 , respectively) as a function of the parameters
governing class size, d(a0, a1, a2, σnsim).
Repeat steps 1-6 for the vector (a0, a1, a2, σnsim) until the distance between data and
simulated auxiliary moments is minimized.
D.3 Details for Quantitative Illustration for Hidden Action Model
Output in the hidden action model depends on several parameters, including the variance of
measurement error on output, σ2η. I adjust the error variance in several steps, using Reading
test scores as the measure:
1. Simulate teacher quality, class sizes, and measurement errors using the parameters
from Section 5.1, for 30,000 teachers. Each simulated teacher then has a simulated
quality θsi and a simulated fixed-effect estimate θˆ
s,FE
i .
2. Use the empirical Bayes weights λ(·) to generate simulated EB measures of teacher
quality according to θˆs,EBi = λ(n(θ
s
i ))θˆ
s,FE
i .
3. Standardize θsi , θˆ
s,FE
i , and θˆ
s,EB
i to have variances of 1, to make the residual variances
comparable.
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4. Finally, I estimate the residual variance from a regression of standardized θˆs,FEi on the
standardized true (simulated) quality θsi and the residual variance from a regression of
standardized empirical Bayes measure θˆs,EBi on standardized true (simulated) quality.
The ratio of residual variances, or amount unexplained in each regression, tells us how
much more (or less) the fixed effects estimator would inform the administrator about
teacher quality.
The regression results, shown in Table 4, indicate that the fixed-effects estimator explains
about 3.2% more variation in teacher quality than the empirical Bayes estimator (1 −
0.69562/0.70702 = 0.032). That is, the fact that the EB estimator makes it more diffi-
cult to separate high- and low-performing teachers when the class size function is negative
quadratic, as it is in the data, can be modeled as increasing the measurement error variance
on teacher output, σ2η, by this amount.
Table 4: Regressions of simulated teacher quality on FE and EB estimates
Dependent variable:
θs (standardized)
(1) (2)
θˆs,FE (standardized) 0.718∗∗∗
(0.004)
θˆs,EB (standardized) 0.707∗∗∗
(0.004)
Constant 0.002 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 30,000 30,000
R2 0.516 0.500
Residual Std. Error (df = 29998) 0.696 0.707
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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